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SUMMARY
The private rented sector (PRS) in England is growing rapidly, in part 
in response to the increasing unaffordability of home ownership and 
the declining supply of social housing. There is mounting concern that 
across a range of indicators it is a poor substitute for both of these 
main alternatives. Tenants enjoy limited rights, their tenancies are 
short, and rents – while in the short-term more affordable than buying 
– are rising faster than incomes, preventing tenants from saving for 
mortgage deposits or even meeting the everyday costs of living. 
The PRS does not need to be a poor relation to home ownership or 
social renting, however, and we can turn our attention to other countries 
in which the challenges presented by the PRS are managed with more 
success. This paper, the second of our series comparing the English and 
German housing markets, explores the lessons policymakers can learn 
from Germany – a country in which renting is the dominant tenure and 
which appears able to offer both stability and security to its 40-million-
plus tenants.
England can learn from Germany in areas of tenancy security, controls 
on cost, and tenant representation. We recommend greater balance between 
the rights of a tenant and the rights of a landlord in England through longer 
tenancies, help with the costs associated with renting (such as deposits and 
letting fees), and stronger, more formalised representation.
KEY FINDINGS
This paper finds a number of similarities between the German and 
English rental markets, including the processes for finding a property to 
rent, checks on tenants’ finances, and expensive deposits. There are also 
similar ownership patterns – in both countries most landlords own only 
one or a few properties. There are, however, many areas of divergence 
in which the German PRS appears more generous and secure, making it 
a more attractive offer to prospective tenants.
• German tenants enjoy strong security of tenure. Most tenancies are 
indefinite and only in very limited circumstances can landlords evict 
tenants. In England, the assured shorthold tenancy is 6–12 months 
as standard, and landlords can evict tenants at the end of the initial 
contract period without justification. Tenants in Germany therefore 
enjoy more stability and assurance in their living arrangements, and 
tend to move house less than their English counterparts. German 
tenancies last, on average, 11 years compared to only 2.5 years in 
England. However, for all these advantages, longer-term tenancies 
in Germany can make it difficult to access new rental properties.
• In Germany the proportion of tenants overburdened by their housing 
costs – paying over 40 per cent of their income towards housing 
– is much lower than in the UK: 23 per cent of renting households 
compared to 33 per cent in the UK. The more plentiful supply of 
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rental properties in Germany and the longer tenancies (which slow the 
process of rent increases) are not the only reasons for this difference. 
Germany’s rent controls place strong restrictions on in-tenancy rent 
increases, and the new ‘rent brake’ will make it more difficult for 
landlords to charge higher rents when re-letting a property. England’s 
rent control system has, in contrast, all but disappeared.
• Tenants in the German PRS comprise a significant political 
powerbase. Forty per cent of households live in the PRS, compared 
to just 19 per cent of English households. Of these German tenants, 
three-quarters are thought to be active voters, versus only half 
of English tenants. Influential tenant bodies further underpin this 
political influence: three million German tenants belong to local tenant 
organisations that can lobby in addition to providing legal cover, 
advice and arbitration for disputes between tenants and landlords.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
Systems of tenure are deeply embedded but, on balance, the greater 
security of tenure that German tenants enjoy in comparison to their 
English neighbours brings with it many more benefits than problems. 
In the long term, England should therefore learn from the German 
example and move towards a system of longer-term rental contracts 
and more protection for tenants.
Wholesale legislative change on tenure security is unlikely to be 
forthcoming in the next parliament, so there are a series of steps which 
can be implemented to gradually increase the length of current tenancies, 
with the public sector leading by example.
• Government should let local authorities, through the planning 
process, require new build-to-rent schemes offer tenancies of 
a minimum of two years, with an appropriate break clause for 
tenants. Local authorities could achieve this through section 106 
agreements if appropriate policy support were included in the 
National Planning Policy Framework.
• Any private rented scheme supported by public money or land 
should require a proportion of homes to offer tenancies of a 
minimum of two years. 
• Not-for-profit builders should lead by example. With housing 
associations and local authorities moving into direct development of 
market-rent housing, they should offer households a range of longer-
term tenancy options in their purpose built PRS schemes. It would be 
helpful to amend schedule one of the Housing Act 1988 to allow local 
authorities to offer assured shorthold tenancies (which they are currently 
barred from doing), as part of new-build schemes, but with longer 
tenancies and appropriate break clauses. Across each of these, tenancy 
agreements should fix any future rent rises upfront, in writing.
However, new homes are only a small part of the rented sector, and there 
is more than can be done to incentivise private landlords to increase the 
security of tenure. 
• Not-for-profit lettings agencies and public online lettings services 
(such as RentSquare) should provide incentives and services 
discounts to private landlords offering longer-term rental contracts.
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Longer-term tenancies act as a natural brake on rising housing costs 
by giving landlords and letting agents fewer opportunities to increase 
tenant rents. However, additional measures could support tenants in 
contesting their rents (formally and informally), and mitigate the high 
cost of deposits.
• The Valuation Office Agency should publish more granular detail 
on the local cost of renting, so that tenants know whether they are 
paying a reasonable local rate. This should include the full range of 
property types (detached, semi, room, maisonette) and property sizes 
alongside the average prices at the ward level. As well as allowing 
tenants to informally challenge their rent with their landlord, it would 
also support tenants to contest unreasonable rents through the 
tribunal process.
The government’s proposed ban of letting agent fees on tenants is 
a welcome and creditable move that follows previous German (and 
Scottish) legal changes. However, deposit costs are still a significant 
burden on tenants, and there is more that could be done to improve 
access to the rental market. For instance:
• local government should work with the insurance industry to 
establish an insurance product to replace the tenancy deposit.
Finally, greater protections for tenants will only come with greater 
political activism and collective voice. To build on the current capacity 
of organisations like Shelter and Generation Rent, mass membership 
organisations could support renters in building a stronger tenant lobby. 
To that end:
• trade unions should work together with housing charities and TMOs 
in taking a more active role in supporting private tenants, helping 
them with legal advice, helping to dispute excessive rents, and 
supporting them in challenging landlords on property conditions 
and management issues.
• a longer-term goal should be to start a tenants’ association nationally, 
with local branches, to mirror the German model
• alternatively, tenants’ insurance offers could be extended to cover 
legal fees which would provide similar opportunities for supporting 
tenants to challenge landlords.
It is important to note, however, that while England can learn a great 
deal from Germany, there remain areas in which the German rental offer 
can be improved. German law, for example, should be revised so that 
the costs of modernisation for energy efficiency improvements can 
no longer be transferred entirely to the tenant in the form of increased 
rents – a system that sees sitting tenants often having to end their 
tenancies as rents become unaffordable, and which indeed may be 
abused to encourage tenants to move out, and circumvent other 
tenancy protections.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Privately rented housing is a critical part of the housing market. It provides 
homes for people who either cannot afford to buy, or do not wish to, and 
provides for families who fail to meet eligibility criteria for social housing. 
It also allows people to move more easily for work, and thus facilitates 
economic growth and development. 
These general tenets hold across both England and Germany, yet the 
demographic profile of those who live in rented housing, and their 
reasons for doing so, differ in a number of important ways betweem 
English and German private tenants. First, as shown in figure 1.1, 
Germany’s rental market is much bigger than England’s, and its position 
appears to be more stable – the proportion of the population renting in 
Germany has shifted little over the last decade, and was at least double 
that of England in the 10 years from 2004 to 2014.
FIGURE 1.1
Germany’s rental market is much bigger than England’s 
Proportion of households in the PRS, 2004–2014
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England’s rental market is growing quickly. In 2004, 2.3 million 
households rented privately, but a decade later that had risen to 
4.3 million – an increase of 86 per cent (DCLG 2016).
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Given the growing significance of renting in England, it is therefore 
worth looking to Germany, one of the largest rental markets among the 
OECD countries (Deschermeier et al 2016), to understand how the state 
manages such a large private housing market successfully. 
WHO RENTS? 
Tenants in England tend to be younger households – 47 per cent of 
private tenants in England are under the age of 35, compared to only 
18 per cent of the population. Some 71 per cent of private tenants 
are under the age of 45. The sector is also more ethnically diverse 
than either owner occupancy or those renting from social landlords 
(DCLG 2016). It has traditionally catered for young people – students, 
young professionals, and economic migrants not looking to own homes. 
However, evidence suggests that the profile of renting in England is 
changing, with growing numbers of households with children living in the 
rented sector too, as rising house prices mean families rent for longer. 
Couples or single parents with children have grown from 23 per cent to 
35 per cent of the rented sector in only a decade (DCLG 2015). Moreover, 
we might expect more pensioners to live in the private rented sector in 
future, as those who were unable to buy properties earlier in their life 
reach retirement age.1
In Germany, where a larger proportion of the population lives in rental 
accommodation, the demographics of tenants are more varied across 
the age and income spectrum – and here, we need to consider all 
tenants, whether in social or privately rented accommodation, as the 
lines between the two are significantly blurred in Germany in a way that 
they are not in England. 
The average age of a ‘head of household’ in the German rented sector 
is 51.9 years (Westerheide 2011). While this is a younger profile than 
German owner occupiers – estimates suggest 58.4 years (ibid) – it is still 
typically older than England’s young rental demographic. 
Renting is also a common experience for individuals from a range of 
social backgrounds. White collar workers are as likely to be private 
tenants as they are owner occupiers, 29 per cent versus 27 per cent, 
while Westerheide (2011: 51) concludes ‘that a broad social spectrum 
– including all income classes and occupational types – lives in rented 
apartments and houses as well as in owner occupied housing’. There are 
nevertheless some similarities with the English experience: the German 
rental market also has a higher proportions of single person households, 
lone parents, and couples without children (Fitzsimons 2014).
WHO OWNS THE RENTED HOMES, AND WHAT IMPACT 
DOES THIS HAVE?
While the demographics of tenants in both countries are relatively varied, 
the ownership structures of their lettings sectors are not. Despite a larger 
rental market in Germany than in England, the ownership structures of 
properties are not hugely different. 
1 This poses a particular challenge for future housing benefit payments. 
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In England, just under 75 per cent of all landlords are private individuals 
or couples rather than companies, and over half of all landlords own 
fewer than five properties with only three per cent of landlords owning 
over 250 (Ball 2010: 22). 
Perhaps surprisingly, given its reputation for attracting institutional 
investors, Germany’s market is structured similarly. Sixty-four per cent 
of rented properties were owned by small-scale, ‘amateur’ landlords, 
and 36 per cent by professional landlords (GDW 2015). The latter 
figure includes stock which, in England, would count as social housing 
(for instance, housing association properties) so in practice the figure for 
the ‘amateur’ part of the private rented sector is much higher. This finding 
is reinforced by a recent study, which found that, of flats rented out 
by small-scale landlords, 57 per cent of landlords owned only one flat, 
while 2 per cent owned more than 15 units (BBSR 2015).
The shape of both markets has been driven by both by external 
forces and public policy. In particular, the limited availability of other 
profitable investments appears to have done much to encourage private 
individuals to invest in renting. Traditional savings vehicles such as bank 
accounts and pensions have performed poorly during long periods of 
low interest rates. In Germany, it is common among pensioners to view 
rental property as providing for their retirement (Westerheide 2011). 
A recent round of the English Wealth and Assets Survey revealed similar 
sentiments in relation to English retirement incomes. When asked which 
would make them more money among a range of options – 44 per cent 
of respondents suggested investing in property, compared to 25 per cent 
for investing in an employer pension (ONS 2016).2
Government policies have also incentivised individual investment, such 
as making the costs of being a landlord tax deductible. 
In Germany, costs associated with refurbishment can be used to offset 
any taxable income to encourage landlords to maintain properties in 
good condition – while landlords can offset losses on rental property 
against other sources of income (Kemp and Kofner 2010). Critically, 
rented homes are also subject to a generous depreciation allowance 
of 2.0–2.5 per cent per annum, a tax allowance that allows investors 
to deduct over time the depreciating value of the asset which, in their 
review for DCLG, Oxley et al (2010) argued was a major component in 
stimulating individual investment in Germany’s private renting sector. 
Additionally, capital gains tax does not apply when a property (including 
an investment property) has been held for over 10 years, giving German 
landlords an incentive to hold on to a property beyond this threshold. 
This has made investment in rented accommodation particularly 
attractive in Germany (De Boer and Bitetti 2014: 38).
The tax treatment of English landlords is less generous than in Germany’s 
case, in the absence of a depreciation allowance.3 However, the incentives 
to purchase second homes remain fairly strong – there are relatively 
2 Although, when asked which was safer, responses revealed the inverse – the perception that employer 
pensions were much safer than investing in housing.
3 Given the real-terms increases in house prices of old and new dwellings across England in recent 
decades, housing has rarely been a depreciating asset over the medium term. 
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weak capital gains and inheritance tax systems, and council tax rules 
that incentivise the acquisition of properties for investment. To encourage 
these homes to be let, English landlords continue to enjoy a limited form 
of mortgage interest tax relief (within new income limits), and can use a 
‘wear and tear’ allowance to deduct basic repairs from their tax liabilities 
(HMRC 2015). 
The shape of the landlord market is said to matter because it may affect the 
extent of professionalism in the management of properties. For example, 
small-time landlords may lack the necessary knowledge or skills to 
responsibly manage their properties. Kemp and Kofner (2010) comment 
that newer landlords in England may lack a comprehensive understanding 
of their responsibilities; Shelter (2011) found that many of the complaints 
made against landlords resulted from landlords not being aware of their 
responsibilities rather than deliberate neglect. Larger property portfolios 
might also achieve economies of scale in management.
Third and finally, the ownership structure of the rental market is an 
important driver of the supply of new housing (see Montague 2012) – in 
particular, a market dominated by larger‚ institutional landlords, will be 
more orientated towards building new homes than a market dominated 
by smaller landlords looking to own only one or two properties. However, 
as we highlight another paper (Davies et al 2016), the provision of rented 
housing in Germany has grown much more quickly than in England 
in spite of similarities in ownership structures, and thus the role of 
institutional investors in Germany appears to have been overplayed. 
Given the dominance of smaller-scale landlords in both countries, 
ownership patterns clearly do not explain the significant difference in the 
quality of the rental offer that separates English and German tenants, 
whether that be in the form of lower rents, longer tenancies, or the higher 
standards of accommodation that are enjoyed. Indeed, a more corporate 
ownership structure may not automatically benefit tenants – in Germany 
it is sometimes suggested that larger, institutional landlords may be 
exclusively interested in maximising their return, and combine attempts 
to aggressively increase rent with a poor service to tenants.4 
4 Observations made under Chatham House rules at Anglo-German Seminar on the PRS, London, 
2 March 2016.
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2. HOW DO TENANTS FIND 
A PROPERTY?
The process of finding a rental property in England and Germany is fairly 
similar. Research as part of the ‘TENLAW: Tenancy Law and Housing 
Policy in Multi-level Europe’ project (Cornelius and Rzeznik 2014) reveals 
that in both countries, a typical route is to use estate agents who can 
assist in both searching for properties and undertaking viewings. As in 
England, the letting agents are typically also involved in negotiating the 
contract on behalf of the landlord, and in managing the property. 
As businesses, letting agents charge for matching tenants with landlords. 
In Germany these fees were traditionally borne by the tenant, at a 
level capped at 2.38 months of rent (two months plus VAT). However, 
legislation introduced in 2015 means that agents’ fees may be charged 
only to the party engaging the agent’s services (usually the landlord, 
rather than the tenant). 
If landlords carry this cost, it may be passed on in higher rents, but only in 
the context of the rent limits set nationally and locally. Official data on the 
impact of this change are not yet available, but leaked data from the federal 
statistical office apparently showed that the average amount charged by 
an agent to a tenant when the tenant engaged the service has fallen to 
50 per cent of its previous level since the policy was introduced (FAZ 2015).
In the 2016 autumn statement, the government announced plans to ban 
letting fees in England. Under current practice, however, letting agent 
fees are usually equal to less than two months’ rent: typically, a tenant 
is charged around £350 (€445) (Shelter 2015)5 on top of what is charged 
to the landlord. While on the surface this may seem a more generous 
settlement than in Germany, it is worth remembering that, on account of 
shorter rental contracts, both parties can be subject to renewal fees on a 
more regular basis than their German counterparts. 
In both countries, alongside legislative changes in relation to letting fees, 
the internet is helping to cut out letting agents altogether. In Germany use 
of public forums and noticeboards (online and offline) is growing, with 
landlords and tenants making their own arrangements directly (see Cornelius 
2014, Sparkes 2014). This practice has increased since the new legislation 
on letting agent fees, as, apparently, have unofficial transfers from one 
tenant to the next (Psotta 2016). Tenants and landlords are increasingly 
circumnavigating letting agents in England too, via direct landlord-to-tenant 
websites such as LandlordDirect and RentSquare. 
While the processes for finding a property may be similar, securing a 
tenancy is a little different. The process in Germany may often be more 
formal, with tenants writing applications to live in a specific property, 
5 Based on currency conversion 5 May 2016.
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and these applications will tend to require a range of documentation. 
For instance, checks will often be made as standard on the tenant’s 
financial status, including credit ratings and debtor lists. While equivalent 
checks in England are common, they remain far from standard practice. 
Perhaps the biggest hurdle of all in Germany, especially in areas with 
high housing demand, is finding a property to rent in the first place 
(Cornelius 2014). This can be considered an ‘insider/outsider’ problem, 
where those already in a secure property with regulated rents will 
hold onto it, while ‘outsiders’ struggle. For Scanlon and Whitehead 
(2014), ‘the outcome of [rent] controls that generate below-market 
rents (whether only for existing tenants or for new tenancies) inherently 
generates insider/outsider issues’, and indeed, in the case of rent 
restrictions on new tenancies when supply is inadequate, ‘queues, 
avoidance, evasion and the exclusion of vulnerable households 
becomes the norm’.
In England on the other hand, higher turnover of rents and fewer 
expectations on the part of the tenant, including looser financial checks 
and a typically smaller deposit (as a percentage of the annual rent), 
means that accessing rented housing is usually relatively quick and easy 
for those able to pay the rent demanded by the local market. 
DEPOSITS AND CONDITIONS
There are substantial deposit requirements in both countries to cover 
damage to the property. In Germany this Kaution can amount to as much as 
three months’ rent, compared to England’s traditionally lower requirements 
of one to two months’ rent (Shelter 2015). The presumption in both cases 
is that deposits will be paid immediately upfront. However, in Germany is 
possible to pay in three monthly instalments (Cornelius 2014). Nevertheless, 
for households on low incomes, in Germany in particular, this represents a 
huge hurdle for first-time tenants, or those who have lost their deposits. 
A significant difference when considering tenant deposits is the 
expectations on tenants with regard to property maintenance. 
• German tenants typically enjoy a lot more freedom over the interior 
of the property – for instance, painting and redecorating without the 
need to inform the landlord. This is an understandable feature of 
an indefinite rental contract. The caveat is that if a tenant acquires 
a newly decorated apartment, the tenant is expected to redecorate 
when they leave. 
• Such conditions are rare in England, where tenants are expected to 
inform landlords of any material changes to the property during their 
stay, and return the property to the original condition when they leave 
– albeit with no requirement to redecorate unless significant damage 
has occurred (Sparkes 2014). 
As Sparkes (2014: 23) goes on to explain for tenancies in England and 
Wales, ‘[s]hould the agreement remain silent […] [on redecoration and 
alterations] there will still be an implied common law condition not to 
commit “waste”: a concept which includes all changes, whether harmful 
or beneficial’. In both England and Germany, where properties have not 
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been kept to the standard they were left in, tenants are liable for any 
damages done, with the cost of the damage deducted from their deposit. 
Building regulations in Germany require all dwellings to have at least one 
habitable room, one toilet, one bath or shower, and a kitchen/kitchenette. 
Any additional aspects depend on the tenancy itself which sets out the 
furnishings the landlord will supply (though flats are often let with no or 
a minimum of furnishings). In England and Wales, properties can be let 
furnished, partly furnished, or unfurnished. Landlords remain responsible 
for installations (and maintenance) of key service utilities (Sparkes 2014) 
but requirements for ‘habitable’ conditions can be fairly limited.
In both countries tenant deposits must be protected: in Germany the 
deposit must be held in a bank savings account – in England deposits 
must go to a deposit protection scheme, which also acts to arbitrate 
between tenants and landlords over the repayment of deposits in the 
case of property damage. In terms of having a modern system in place 
to protect tenant deposits, England would appear to have the edge. 
However, a much wider arbitration role is played by German tenant 
associations, beyond merely disputes over deposit recovery. 
SUMMARY
In both countries, tenants looking for a property will go through similar 
processes, looking for properties via letting agents or online, paying 
hefty deposits (especially in Germany), and going through various vetting 
processes, which again in Germany appear to be more stringent. 
A core difference is that finding a property in Germany can be much more 
difficult, and for various reasons the German rental market, with its long 
tenancies and low turnover, bears the hallmarks of an insider/outsider 
market, at least in the more pressured housing areas.
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3. HOW SECURE ARE 
TENANCIES?
The starkest difference between the two countries’ rental markets is in 
the security of renting in England and Germany. In England, the system 
of tenancy law is loosely governed. Private tenants do not enjoy a right 
to a written tenancy agreement, though most tenants will have one 
(CAB 2016). Most rental contracts signed after 1997 will be assured 
shorthold tenancies (or ASTs), which typically provide security of tenure 
for at least six months, but generally a year. Tenancies are allowed to roll 
forward past the defined period in the contract, with either the tacit or 
explicit agreement of the landlord and tenant, but this ‘rolling contract’ 
period typically offers tenants less security than the period they originally 
signed up for. 
The consequence of more flexible rental contracts, and the different 
expectations of landlords and tenants of the UK rental market means 
that tenancies are typically fairly short. In England and Wales, an 
average tenancy lasts just 2.5 years (Allsop 2016) – and even shorter in 
high-pressure housing markets where the risks of void periods are lower.
The situation in Germany is quite different. Most tenancies are signed 
on an indefinite basis. Research using the German Socio-Economic 
Panel Study6 has found that, as of 2010, the mean tenancy in Germany 
is 11 years, and the median tenancy length since 2006 has been 
approximately six years (Fitzenberger and Fuchs 2013). The law 
underpins indefinite tenancies, and offers very few exceptions apart from 
certain forms of ‘tied’ accommodation (Whitehead et al 2012: 136).
There is some variation within the sector: for instance, the higher end of 
the market tends to have shorter tenancies relative to the lower end – 
eight years compared to 13 years (Fitzenberger and Fuchs 2013). It is not 
clear from the data whether this is a consequence of more mobile tenants 
at the top end of the market and vice versa, or whether those able to 
afford higher rents terminate contracts earlier because they have bought 
a property. 
Longer tenancies also reflect a culture of a longer-term investment 
outlook among German landlords. House price growth has, for decades, 
been very weak in Germany and, coupled with a tax system that stresses 
long-term investment (by grading away capital gains tax on properties 
over 10 years), there are therefore fewer incentives for landlords to sell 
(Kemp and Kofner 2010), and thus take possession of the property from 
the tenant. Allied to this, the higher resultant quality of rental properties 
and protected rents may drive tenants to want to stay put (ibid). 
6 A representative annual household panel survey including over 11,000 households in Germany, 
with analysis starting in 1985 and being continued on a yearly basis.
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Stability can benefit tenants and the wider communities. Moving home less 
frequently means children can enjoy greater consistency in their schooling, 
and there are increased opportunities to build community ties and integrate 
into neighbourhood activities. There is, though, a balance to be struck here 
– as Kemp and Kofner (2010) put it, ‘Residential mobility is relatively low in 
Germany, something that is both a cause and an effect of the long leases 
and strong security of tenure’. If especially strong advantages are given 
to existing tenants rather than their potential successors, that may lead to 
insider/outsider problems, lower levels of mobility (impacting, for instance, 
upon the labour market), and problems of unofficial, parallel markets. 
ENDING TENANCIES 
It is relatively straightforward to end a tenant’s contract in England. 
As Wilson notes: 
‘These [AST] tenants have no long-term security of tenure. 
Landlords cannot regain possession of the property within the 
first six months of the tenancy (unless the tenant is in breach 
of the agreement) but thereafter, they may regain possession 
provided the correct notice procedures are followed. It is not 
necessary for a landlord of an assured shorthold tenant to 
establish any ‘fault’ on the part of the tenant in order to regain 
possession of the property concerned.’ 
Wilson 2015
This means that, for whatever reason, at the end of a (short) tenancy 
a landlord can make it difficult for the tenant to stay by raising the rent, 
or can simply ask the tenant to leave at the end of their contract. 
If the tenant refuses to leave, a landlord can serve a section 21 notice 
(known as a ‘no-fault eviction’), which gives a tenant two months to move 
out, or go through the courts to forcibly remove the tenant by a court order. 
Indeed, it is reportedly becoming increasingly common in high-pressure 
housing markets for section 21 notices to be used to time for the end of the 
contractual period, to ensure that contract renegotiations or a termination 
of the tenancy can be initiated immediately and to prevent moving into the 
rolling on period (Osborne and Collinson 2015). 
German procedures provide much greater security. In the case of 
indefinite tenancies, those where the lease has been entered into for 
an unlimited period, tenants have the right to give ‘ordinary notice’ – 
a notice period of three months to end the tenancy. They are not required 
to provide justification. The landlord can also pursue this route but only 
if their circumstances change to meet fixed-term requirements, and 
supporting evidence must be provided (Cornelius 2014).7 The notice 
7 The alternative to indefinite tenancies is a fixed-term tenancy. These are rare, however, since they can 
only be secured if and when the landlord is able to prove that: (a) they wish to use the property in the 
future for themselves or their family; (b) they have plans to demolish the property, or carry out significant 
alterations; or (c) they have the intention of transferring the tenancy to an employee (Cornelius 2014). This 
must be established when the tenancy is agreed and so where it is not – and the landlord fails to provide 
sufficient proof – an indefinite tenancy will be standard practice. If the landlord’s circumstances or plans 
change during the tenancy, the tenant may also request a change in status from definite to indefinite, 
returning them to the standard practice. Similarly, if the landlord wishes to give ordinary notice, these are 
the conditions which must be satisfied with evidence provided.
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period in this instance can range from three to nine months, calculated 
according to how long the tenant(s) has been resident.
Furthermore, tenants may issue an objection should they be able to 
provide evidence to suggest the ending of the tenancy would lead to 
hardship for them or their family and household (Fitzsimons 2014). The 
emphasis of these rules tends to strongly favour the security of the tenant, 
offering them a longer period over which to find alternative suitable 
accommodation – and to manage any associated changes to employment 
or other circumstances. The three months afforded to landlords in these 
cases is also typically longer than under an English AST; therefore they 
can also enjoy a longer period in which to find new tenants, reducing the 
likelihood of an empty property and loss of income.
Landlords can also pursue either ‘immediate notices’ or ‘specific notices’ 
if they wish to end a tenancy agreement but both require a specific 
reason. In the former, this might include issues with late rent payment 
(two months or more) or criminal behaviour in the property, and can 
result in immediate termination while the latter refers to special cases 
prescribed by law including the death of a tenant where the family do not 
wish to continue the tenancy (ibid). Exempt from these rules, however, 
are tenancy scenarios where the landlord also lives in the property. 
The security of tenure offered to German tenants means that they move 
house less than tenants in some other countries. An international survey 
of private tenants in 2007 found that around only 10 per cent of German 
households had moved home in the previous two years, compared to 
15 per cent of British households (Scanlon and Whitehead 2014). On the 
one hand, this is evidence of greater stability, on the other, it may reduce 
labour market flexibility, by making it more difficult for tenants relocating 
for work to find accommodation. 
SUMMARY
The German tenant’s position, once in a property, is strong. As Fitzsimons 
summarises: ‘German law affords a very expansive concept of a lease 
contract, where the tenant’s position is very close to a property right. 
In other words, the lease contract gives claim possession when the object 
is in possession of the tenant’ (Fitzsimons 2014: 6).
England’s tenants, on the other hand, enjoy very little security of tenure 
– contracts are short, and a landlord needs no justification at the end 
of that period for forcing an eviction. This gives tenants little protection 
against eviction if, for instance they complain about their property 
management, conditions, or even their rents. 
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4. HOW ARE  
RENTS MANAGED?
In both countries, the cost of renting privately is a problem. In the UK, 
research by Shelter in 2011 found that in more than half the country, 
renting a two-bedroom property cost more than 35 per cent of median 
full-time take-home pay, rendering it unaffordable (Shelter 2011). The 
housing cost overburden (or the proportion of households paying more 
than 40 per cent of their incomes on their housing costs) in both the UK 
and in Germany is highest for market tenants. What is also apparent, 
though, is that costs are lower on average for German tenants than 
UK tenants, as the following data from Eurostat illustrates.
TABLE 4.1
Housing cost overburden rates in Germany and the UK, 
by tenure status, 2014
Owner with 
 mortgage or loan Social/free tenant Market tenant
Germany 11.3% 16.6% 23.1%
UK 6.3% 15.7% 33.2%
Source: Eurostat 2016b8 
Note: The housing cost overburden rate is the percentage of the population living in households where the 
total housing costs (‘net’ of housing allowances) represent more than 40 per cent of disposable income 
(‘net’ of housing allowances).
Analysis by the UK’s National Housing Federation using Eurostat data in 
2015 found that average monthly rents in the UK were €902 (equivalent at 
the time of analysis to £730). This amounts to 40 per cent of private tenants’ 
income being spent on accommodation costs. In Germany, an average 
rent is closer to €600, only 25 per cent of household income (Koessl 2015). 
Rents in the UK rose by 3.1 per cent in the year to August 2016, and by 
5.6 per cent in the year prior to that, while in Greater London they were up 
2.7 per cent, following an increase of 7.7 per cent the year before. The same 
index found rents for new lets in 2016 averaged £913 across the UK and 
£1,497 in Greater London (Homelet 2016). This suggests rents are on an 
upward trajectory and we might expect further rises in the future.
There are a number of factors which explain why the costs of renting 
are higher in the England (and the UK) than they are in Germany. 
One is that Germany has successfully managed to deliver faster growth 
in housing supply than England. Between 1951 and 2014, 30 million 
new homes were built across East and West Germany, compared to 
8 Note: The housing cost overburden rate is the percentage of the population living in households where 
the total housing costs (‘net’ of housing allowances) represent more than 40 per cent of disposable 
income (‘net’ of housing allowances).
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13 million in England (according to the relevant tables from national 
statistical agencies). This has meant the supply of homes has kept pace 
with demand, meaning a more stable housing market, and effectively 
no house price inflation in the last 20 years. Without significant inflation 
in the housing market, the returns that landlords need to make on their 
investment do not significantly change over time, and therefore new 
landlords do not need to charge higher rents to meet the costs of their 
mortgages than landlords who bought their properties earlier. 
Another core explanation is the nature of tenancies. The length of 
tenancy appears to be linked to what rents tenants pay – typically those 
who have been living in a property longer will pay lower rents than new 
tenants. This offers one explanation for why policymakers in England are 
interested in extending the length of tenancies, so as to act as a brake 
on rent increases. As the English Housing Survey explains:
‘In general, those who have lived in their home longer paid 
less rent. Private tenants that were in their current home 
for less than a year paid an average weekly rent of £198 
compared with £158 for residents of 5–9 years’
DCLG 2016
Within a tenancy’s agreed contractual period in England, landlords 
cannot increase the rent charged to tenants unless it is written into the 
contract. However, because rent contracts are relatively short in England, 
the rent paid by tenants who wish to stay in the same property can be 
increased every time a contract is renewed. Germany’s comparably 
lengthy tenancies may therefore have acted as a brake on rent increases.
A final key explanation for Germany’s lower rents is that they have been 
enforced through regulation. 
RENT REGULATION IN ENGLAND
The private rental sector in England faces a relatively limited system of 
rent regulation (Cooke and Hull 2012, Davies and Turley 2014). This was 
not always the case. Before the Housing Act 1988 set about dismantling 
‘regulated tenancies’, most private lets were subject to quite stringent 
regulations. The ‘fair rents’ regime that regulated tenancies offered 
tenants a relatively generous system of rent control, where local rent 
officers would determine the maximum rent chargeable on a property. 
The factors that determined their decision included: 
• the age, location, and state of repair of the house
• the quality and quantity of any furniture provided 
• an assumption that there was no shortage of comparable rental 
properties in the area.
The rent officer making the evaluation would also have to ignore the 
personal circumstances of the tenant. 
The corollary of this was that rents were typically significantly below 
the local market level (Wilson 2014). A look at housing benefit statistics 
provides some insight into average rents paid by tenants still under a 
regulated rental contract. In 2008, the average weekly award for standard 
PRS housing benefit claimants was around £107 per week – but the 
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average weekly award for regulated tenants was as little as £71 per week, 
some 34 per cent lower. Even as housing benefit awards in regulated 
tenancies have risen, and controls over local housing allowances have 
been cut to the 30th percentile of the market, and frozen since 2011, 
average weekly awards in regulated tenancies remain some 13 per cent 
below unregulated claims (DWP 2016). 
The deregulation of tenancies that began at the end of the 1980s and 
continued into the 1990s was intended to stimulate investment in the PRS 
and to make it easier for landlords to take possession of their property 
(Wilson 2014). Consequently, there are now very few privately rented 
properties in England that remain subject to any effective form of rent 
control. While there are no accurate estimates of the number of regulated 
tenancies left in England, the numbers of regulated tenancies claiming 
housing benefit is tiny – of around 1.5 million private tenants claiming 
housing benefit, only 25,000 live in regulated tenancies (DWP 2016). 
Thus in England, for the majority of tenants, there are now no robust 
restrictions on private rents. Yet a couple of factors can still influence 
rents – one is where landlord’s rent-setting is influenced by housing 
benefit levels. Previous evidence has found that reducing housing 
benefit levels can, in some areas, reduce rents (Gibbons and Manning 
2006, Brewer et al 2014). However, this is only effective in low-demand 
markets, and in any case, five years of freezes to housing benefits have 
eaten away at the leverage housing-benefit-setting might have had on 
market rents. 
Tenants can attempt to reduce what they perceive to be an excessive 
rent by appealing to a First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) – a group 
made up usually of a surveyor, lawyer and lay member (Shelter 2016). 
Any application against an excessive rent must be made within the first 
six months of an AST (if you renew the tenancy, you cannot apply). In 
doing so, a tenant would need to demonstrate that their rents were far 
in excess of the local market rate for equivalent properties. If approved, 
the rent could be reduced accordingly. 
However, this avenue is rarely utilised – the insecurity of tenure that 
comes with an AST means that while a rent may be adjusted for the 
remaining period of the tenancy, this would not prevent legal eviction 
procedures beginning at the end of the contracted period – the absence 
of security of tenure from either a length of tenure or evictions standpoint, 
mean that in the current context, the restrictions on excessive rents 
have no impact on the market: there were only around 9,000 residential 
property tribunal cases in 2013/14, and rent dispute cases are only one 
part of their role, which covers right to buy, leasehold valuations, park 
homes and a range of other residential property issues. 
RENT REGULATION IN GERMANY
While England’s policymakers have stepped away from rent-setting in the 
PRS, Germany has been increasingly active in protecting tenants from rent 
increases, through both first and, now, second generation rent controls. 
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The ‘first’ generation model typically caps rents at a specific level relative 
to local market rents, whereas the ‘second’ generation typically limits rent 
increases within the period of the tenancy for individual tenants. 
The second generation model has held a long-standing role in Germany’s 
rental markets, and operationally restricts the scale of rent increases that 
can be applied during a tenancy. The landlord can determine the rent at 
the time of the property coming to the market. 
Obviously, this model is underpinned by strong tenancy rights. 
For example, over a three-year period, rents cannot be increased by 
more than 20 per cent, and landlords are restricted to maintaining rents 
at a given level for at least 12 months. Tenants also have a month to 
decide whether or not to accept the rent increase and, in the case of 
rejecting the proposed increase, two further months’ notice before 
moving out. Tenants can therefore be guaranteed 15 months of renting 
at a set rental amount (Fitzsimons 2014). The evidence suggests that the 
model was, for sitting tenants at least, effective in that the rents paid by 
long-standing tenants subject to the regulation were significantly below 
local market levels (Whitehead et al 2012). 
Yet, despite the effectiveness of second generation controls, in 2015 the 
federal government returned to a system of rent caps – ‘the rent brake’ 
(Mietpreisbremse), where Land governments (or state governments), 
in high-pressure housing markets (based on rent levels, rent increases, 
population growth, and levels of empty properties) can introduce a 
maximum local rent ceiling. It acts by prohibiting landlords from charging 
rents for similar properties in excess of 10 per cent above a given local 
average (unless the previous tenant had paid above that level, in which 
case the new tenant could be charged up to the level paid hitherto). 
The brake applies only to new tenancies, and therefore tenants cannot 
renegotiate retrospectively if they think their current tenancy exceeds the 
current local rent ceiling. To prevent a wider impact on the development 
market, the brake exempts newly built homes from any rent controls for 
the time being. 
To date, this legislation has been enacted in all of Berlin and Hamburg, 
several major cities in North-Rhine Westphalia and, interestingly, in 
over 100 municipalities in the staunchly conservative state of Bavaria 
(Stiftung Warentest 2016).
THE PROBLEMS OF THE RENT BRAKE
There are a number of challenges to implementing the rent brake that are 
worth considering, including the impact on supply and quality, and the 
information needed to enforce rent controls. 
Supply and quality 
In some ways, the German system has sought to offset some of the risks 
associated with rent controls, such as the impact on supply and the risk 
that the quality of accommodation is lower. This is because the new law 
does not apply to new builds, or to homes that have been subject to 
extensive modernisation. 
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However, the supply impact may not have been fully avoided. An exercise 
carried out by Deschermeier et al (2016), using data from 2014 on the 
PRS in Berlin and Cologne concludes that there is a very real danger 
of supply diminishing – through rising sales to owner-occupiers as the 
returns on renting become less attractive – and demand increasing, 
where tenants anticipate affordable and attractive rents.
Further, the rules around modernisation expose a significant loophole, 
and give the landlord a very strong position vis-à-vis the tenant 
(Fitzsimons 2014). 
• When modernisation takes place the landlord can pass on the costs 
to the tenant and increase the annual rent by 11 per cent of the cost 
of the modernisation. This increase can occur in addition to a normal 
rent increase. 
• Even once the costs of the modernisation have been paid off by the 
tenant, the rent can stay at the higher level. Moreover, the landlord 
can justify further rent increases because the dwelling is now at a 
higher standard. 
The modernisation legislation has therefore acted as an investment 
strategy to bypass rent controls. As a result, future rent increases are 
now less predictable for tenants, and rent increases can be so high 
that tenants are, in effect, forced to leave. As a result, the city authority 
in Berlin has acted to prevent conversions of normal flats into luxury 
apartments in certain overheating areas of the city to limit this kind of 
behaviour, as well as banning Airbnb lettings in certain areas to ensure 
that homes are not converted into short-term holiday lets (Spiegel 2016).
Enforcement
The other significant problem with the rent brake, as designed, is the 
enforcement mechanism. In order to take action, a tenant would need to 
secure a tenancy, then take legal action against the landlord to get the 
rent reduced. The first problem is that the landlord would face no penalty 
or backdating for charging excessive rent, even if the rent was reduced 
post-arbitration. Second, having just accepted a new rent, by ‘signing 
on the dotted line’, tenants may be reluctant to launch immediate legal 
action to challenge that rent (Berliner Mieterverein 2016a). 
In response to these enforcement issues the Berlin Tenants’ Union 
launched a campaign to encourage tenants to check their new rent 
(Berliner Mieterverein 2016b). Only 58 tenants took advantage of this 
facility (out of over 100,000 tenancies signed in Berlin each year). 
In 95 per cent of cases the rent appeared to be above the level permitted, 
with an average excess of 32 per cent – although of course in this case 
hefty ‘selection bias’ is likely, as those undertaking the check were likely 
to be concerned about their level of rent.
Third, although a tenant has the right to ask whether a rent is in 
excess of 10 per cent of the local reference rent (based on local rent 
tables), this information is not always available to them at the start of 
the tenancy. All local rent tables must make reference to size, layout, 
fittings and fixtures, quality, and location when establishing comparable 
rates. However, methodologies for classifying properties and areas 
can be vague and lacking in transparency. The result is that controls 
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effectively become a freeze covering whole areas. Costly to compile, 
the ability for local areas to employ more rigorous techniques and 
keep tables up-to-date is a further challenge. If more representative 
and regular tables could be guaranteed, the rent controls would be 
limited to the outliers. Landlords would therefore have less incentive 
to sell, and supply would remain more constant (ibid: 20). Currently, 
Germany is a long way from that point: of the 294 municipalities in 
which the rent brake applies, only 77 advertise any rent tables on 
their website, and even a major city like Bremen lacks such a table 
(Stiftung Warentest 2016). In fact, this then has the opposite effect to 
that feared by Deschermeier et al (2016): a tenant would need to set 
out, in his or her legal challenge of the rent, details of why the rent was 
excessive, in effect needing to construct an evidence base: a serious 
obstacle to implementation. 
Impact on rents
So far three studies have been conducted on the impact of the rent 
brake. The first, by the consultancy Empirica (2016), analysed rents in 
five major German cities in the months after the introduction of the brake. 
It had three main findings.
1. The median rent for a new tenancy fell in the months immediately 
following the introduction of the brake, by up to 2 per cent, but 
then climbed to the previous level, or in the case of Düsseldorf 
(up 3.5 per cent after 5 months) and Berlin (up 2 per cent after 
six months) exceeded it (ibid: 1).
2. In Berlin the number of flats for sale exceeded the number of flats for 
rent, suggesting that landlords were ‘selling up’ to avoid having to 
offer a restricted rent (ibid: 2–3).
3. Contrary to expectations, in only one of the cities studied – Munich 
– had rents at the bottom end of the market fallen (ibid: 2).
The Berlin Tenants’ Union also commissioned two studies to investigate 
the impact of the rent brake. Regio Kontext (2016) analysed over 50,000 
rental property advertisements in Berlin from the time both before and after 
the introduction of the rent brake. It found over 80 per cent of properties 
appeared to be above the level permitted, with an average excess of €2.18 
per m2 per month (35 per cent above the permitted level). Excesses were 
particularly pronounced in the older buildings in the city (pre-1918), and were 
more modest in flats in the east of the city, built between 1973 and 1990. 
A further study, by the IFSS (2016), drew a similar conclusion, with an 
analysis not only of private advertisements on a particular day in March 
2016, but also advertisements from public housing companies. It found 
average rents were above the permitted level, with especially high values 
in attractive central districts. There was a distinction between types of 
landlord: the levels of excess were highest for small private landlords 
(€3.08 per m2), and private companies (€2.35 per m2), with public housing 
companies exceeding the permitted level by far less (€0.39 per m2).
While there is little appetite in the current government for rent controls 
in the PRS in England, the German efforts to introduce caps highlight 
a number of lessons for those interested in their design, which can be 
summarised as follows.
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1. Rent brakes need to be underpinned by live, good quality data.
2. Placing responsibility on tenants to enforce rents brakes after 
they have signed the contract weakens their position vis-à-vis the 
landlord – different models that put the onus on the landlord setting 
rents appropriately are necessary. 
3. Exemptions for substantial improvements need to be designed 
carefully if affordable housing supply is to be maintained.
SUMMARY: WIDER ISSUES WITH CONTROLLING RENTS
Generally, trying to control rents is controversial, and the liberalisation 
of the English rental market is seen by some as a considerable success. 
For instance, the housing academic Michael Ball wrote that: 
‘Rent controls and permanent security of tenure have been 
successfully abolished in the UK. To go back to them would 
create severe market distortions and cost the Treasury dearly 
for no clear social or economic benefit. […] Success has come 
about by allowing a free market to operate and the forces 
of competition within it to work.’ 
Ball 2004
Moreover, there are a number of wider objections to any form of rent 
control given that it can have the following effects: 
• disincentivise new supply, by reducing demand from potential investors
• disincentivise investment in property, since returns will reduce over time
• lead landlords to seek other means of generating income from their 
properties, circumventing any controls by charging for other elements 
tied to the tenancy (for example, inventory).
• encourage landlords to sell where the demand of house buyers 
– and the prices they are willing to pay – will come to exceed the 
potential income from future tenants (Deschermeier et al 2016).
It is too early to draw firm conclusions on the impact of the German rent 
brake – however, the studies pointed at hitherto suggest the design of 
the ‘second generation’ rent controls (those affecting new tenancies) is 
sufficiently unwieldy for tenants that it will be seriously limited in its effects.
Nonetheless, looking at England, it is difficult to conclude that the fully 
liberalised system is the best model in town. While investment in buy-to-let 
has grown significantly, and the quality of housing has generally improved 
over the last few decades (though the PRS continues to be in much worse 
condition than other tenures) from the important perspective of tenant 
affordability, it is clear that liberalising rent setting has not spurred new 
supply to the extent that affordability has improved. Rents are consuming a 
growing proportion of household incomes, and housing benefit in the private 
rented sector is absorbing a significant proportion of the costs. In the last 
year alone, some £9.4 billion was spent subsidising the costs of private rents 
for households on low incomes (DWP 2016) – a number that has sharply 
increased in recent years.
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5. HOW ARE TENANTS 
SUPPORTED IN DISPUTES?
Beyond the security of tenure and rent setting distinctions, a final significant 
difference between the rental markets in England and Germany is the 
structure of the support available for tenants in dispute with their landlords. 
In England, while tenant groups are more common in social housing, 
there are no strong large-scale tenant organisations for the PRS. 
Instead, tenants can obtain free advice on how to address problems 
with their tenancies through organisations like Citizens Advice, or 
Shelter, although these organisations have witnessed dramatic funding 
reductions in recent years (Bowcott 2013), with reductions in legal aid 
and local government funding. Local authorities may also provide some 
support directly, in ensuring landlords meet their legal obligations or to 
prevent homelessness. 
In recent years the national campaigning organisation Generation Rent 
has also come forward as a representative body for tenant rights. While 
seeking to influence legislation and policy, they also aim to establish 
a network of private tenants organised through local private tenants’ 
groups. However, activity here is again focused primarily on campaigns 
as opposed to a more formal union-based structure. 
In Germany tenants are much more strongly organised at both the local 
and national level, and are therefore better able to individually and 
collectively bargain for improved conditions and to address legal issues 
with their landlords. 
The German Tenants ‘Association (DMB) represents around 320 distinct 
tenants’ associations who provide legal cover and advice to their 
members in exchange for membership fees. The 320 organisations that 
are members of the union are estimated to represent around 1.3 million 
tenant households in Germany, or some 3 million tenants. 
Unlike with other forms of insurance or legal cover, it is possible to join 
a tenants’ association when a problem arises, and immediately get 
assistance, so in practice protection is even more widespread. Moreover, 
there are over 21 million legal expenses protection insurance policies 
held in Germany (GDV 2013) which, as well as providing financial support 
for arbitration, provide assistance for court cases too. 
In both countries (for the UK, see Battersby 2015), issues between 
tenants and landlords are usually dealt with outside of the courts, either 
informally between landlords and local authorities, or in Germany’s 
cases, in local arbitration services, tenancy association negotiations with 
landlords, or other local formal and informal mechanisms. Estimates from 
the DMB suggest that it handles some 1.2 million legal consultations 
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per year, with 97 per cent of issues raised being dealt with outside of the 
judicial system (Deutscher Mieterbund 2016). 
English statistics on landlord and tenant disputes are opaque, and the 
limited data is spread across a wide range of data sources. Residential 
property tribunals oversaw around 9,000 cases, while other data from 
the Department of Justice show that private landlord’s claims on 
repossessing their properties numbered around 22,000 claims in 2015 
(Department of Justice 2016).
In Germany there are estimated to be some 270,000 cases per year in the 
German court (Deutscher Mieterbund 2015). Given that the cost associated 
with going to the lowest court will often be around half of the amount of 
the money at stake (Berliner Mieterverein 2013), it is understandable that 
both landlords, tenants and their representative bodies are keen to avoid 
the formal legal route, but this also explains why legal insurance and 
membership of local tenants associations is relatively popular. 
With legal cover financed through membership fees, there are obvious 
incentives for tenants to exercise their rights more readily, especially 
in an environment where tenancies are highly protected. According to 
Fitzsimons (2014), the same is not true of landlords; legal insurance for 
landlords is significantly more expensive, and thus less popular, which in 
itself may encourage more landlords to settle earlier. No such equivalent 
tenant insurance system exists in the UK. 
That is not to say that the German system covers all tenants equally – 
for instance, the city of Frankfurt provides its own housing advice service 
for those on low incomes, as it found that they struggled to enforce their 
rights through other channels. It also found that doing so helped prevent 
homelessness among vulnerable households.9
Moreover, as set out above, a major problem with the ‘rent brake’ to 
date has been that it requires a tenant to pursue individual litigation to 
demonstrate that their rents are excessive, and in practice that hurdle has 
proven too high for tenants – something that will be even more difficult 
for low-income tenants who are not protected by municipal tenant 
associations – making the issue of an insider/outsider market more 
challenging still for those on low incomes. 
STATUTORY PROTECTION FOR TENANTS
Understanding why German tenants enjoy such greater protection needs 
to be situated in terms of their political power. The wider cross section 
of households who rent, in terms of age and income, may help to explain 
why German governments have been more prepared to be interventionist 
and pro-tenant than their English counterparts. Given the size of the 
renting population in Germany, the German renting classes have a wider 
and deeper electoral powerbase than the smaller, younger and more 
mobile English rented sector. 
9 Interview with city official, August 2015.
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Germany’s electoral system may advantage tenants too: individuals 
in Germany are registered automatically once they register with the 
municipality – a necessary stage in moving property – and thus the 
process is much easier. Thus, there is less variation in registration 
rates across tenure types in Germany. Turnout, however, still differs, 
with estimates using European Social Survey data suggesting 
homeowners vote at a rate of 87 per cent compared to 76 per cent of 
non-homeowners (André et al 2015). This remains higher than the rates 
of English tenants, though, and suggests residents in the German PRS 
would tend to enjoy more voice in German politics, not least because 
renting is more of a ‘mainstream’ tenure, and settled individuals with a 
stable income are far more likely both to vote (in both countries), and, 
in Germany, to rent rather than own their home.
English tenants on the other hand tend to have weaker power at the 
ballot box, not just because they are smaller in number, but also because 
of the transient nature of rental populations and the requirement to 
register to vote individually through a distinct process (one which is not 
tied to other administrative requirements attached to moving house) upon 
each move. The latest Electoral Commission figures for Great Britain 
report that those who own their house outright have a registration rate 
of 94 per cent, with mortgage/shared ownership individuals registered 
at 89 per cent and social tenants at 81 per cent. In stark contrast, only 
63 per cent of private tenants are registered (Electoral Commission 
2014: 38). In elections, tenants’ turnout is also far lower – in part due 
to non-registration, but also as a result of tenants typically being less 
connected to a local community and more likely to be living in shared 
accommodation where direct canvassing is more difficult. In the 2015 
UK general election, only 51 per cent of tenants are thought to have 
voted compared to 56 per cent of social tenants, 69 per cent of mortgage 
holders, and 77 per cent of homeowners (Ipsos-MORI 2015).
SUMMARY
It would certainly appear that both through the courts and, more 
importantly, through informal action stopping short of a full legal process, 
German tenants are able, backed by lawyers or tenants’ unions, to hold 
landlords to account. 
We should be wary, however, of drawing from this the conclusion that a 
future English system, relying on individual litigation to enforce rights, 
is necessarily the best way to support tenants to enforce their rights. It 
might also be the case that the nature of tenants and renting in Germany 
(with a wider cross-section of society, including more stable, prosperous 
and highly educated households, coupled with strong security of tenure) 
leads to more assertiveness vis-à-vis landlords through the legal process.
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
From this overview, it is clear that sitting tenants in Germany enjoy 
stronger stability and protection in the rental market than their English 
neighbours, and at significantly lower costs. In particular, they benefit 
from greater security of tenure, protection from no-fault evictions, and 
the presumption that tenancies will be indefinite unless the tenant wishes 
to terminate the contract. Coupled with lower rental costs generally, and 
the imposition of both first and second generation rent controls, sitting 
tenants enjoy much greater protection from increased rents than do 
English tenants, who face the prospect of regular tenancy renewals and 
corresponding rent increases – as well as the broader disruption of more 
regular moves. 
The statutory protection is an important distinguishing feature, locking in 
longer tenancies and rent safeguards. But tenants also enjoy protection 
from civil society organisations, through tenant associations, for which 
no parallel exists in England. This offers a further degree of protection 
to tenants: their membership organisations can do their legal bidding in 
disputes with landlords over security, quality, and also the fixing of rents. 
\\\
As the rental market in England grows, as it has done quickly in the last 
decade, increased political power for tenants may follow, and with it 
more structural reforms to support struggling tenants to manage their 
tenancies, their rents, and disputes with their landlords. 
TABLE 6.1
German and English tenancies compared
Germany England
Proportion of 
households PRS
39.6% 19.4%**
Typical tenancy 
agreement
Indefinite tenancies 
Anything shorter/fixed allowed only in 
very limited circumstances
Assured shorthold tenancies (ASTs) 
Typically last at least 6 months, usually 
a year, before being continued through 
a rolling contract.
Average (mean) 
tenancy length
11 years 2.5 years*
Deposits Three months’ rent (payable in three 
instalments over three months) 
Must be invested by landlord, typically 
in a savings bank account.
One to two months’ rent (payable at 
start of tenancy) 
Must be paid into a national tenancy 
deposit scheme.
Letting agent fees Charged by letting agents for matching 
tenants with landlords. Historically, 
equivalent to one month’s rent but 
following a ban on charging tenants, the 
cost rests solely on landlords.
Charged by letting agents for matching 
tenants with landlords. Typically around 
£350, and charged both to tenants 
and landlords. In November 2016, the 
government announced plans to ban 
letting fees.
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Germany England
Housing cost 
over-burden 
(owner occupier in 
parentheses)
23.1% (11.3%) 33.2%* (6.3%)*
Age of tenant 
(owner occupier in 
parentheses)
Mean age (of ‘head of household’) 
51.9 years (58.4 years)
71% of tenants under 45 years**
Notice period  
(options and length)
Tenants: (1) ‘ordinary notice’ of three 
months; (2) ‘immediate notice’ (in 
cases where there is deemed to be 
significant endangerment to health).
Landlords: (1) ‘ordinary notice’ of three 
to nine months (dependent on length of 
tenancy and must include supporting 
evidence); (2) ‘immediate notices’ 
(in cases of late payment, criminal 
activity etc.); (3) ‘special notices’ 
(in cases of tenant death).
Tenants: two months’ notice required 
following end of AST-defined period.
Landlords: two months’ notice required 
following end of AST-defined period. No 
evidence or justification is required to 
evict on these grounds.
Average 
monthly rent 
€600 €902* (equivalent to £730)
Proportion of 
income spent 
on rent
25% 40%*
Rent control 2013: ‘Rent brake’ available for 
high-pressure housing markets to set 
rent rises at 15% over three years. 
(Previously and outside these areas, 
20% over three years with rent stability 
required for every 12-month period.)
2015: Rents cannot be set at more 
than 10% of comparable properties 
in the areas in these high-pressure 
housing markets.
No practical form of rent control outside 
of AST-defined rent (potential to refer 
excessive rent to a tribunal but landlord 
retains option of ending tenancy if 
dissatisfied with outcome).
Tenant 
representation
German Tenants’ Association (and 
associated local branches).
No large-scale tenants’ associations 
beyond the social housing sector.
Tenant insurance 
(legal)
Legal fees covered by membership 
of tenants’ association or private 
insurance.
Limited, if any, provision within tenants’ 
insurance policies for covering legal 
fees.
* Data for the UK 
** Data for England and Wales
RECOMMENDATIONS
Clearly, the German market is not perfect. It has rigid rules that can 
disadvantage those looking to get into the rental market, especially those 
on low incomes who face a range of hurdles in accessing a settled tenancy. 
However, it is more fit for purpose than England’s highly liberalised market, 
which offers landlords a great deal of power in repossessing their property 
and setting rents at whatever level the market will allow, while offering 
tenants little by way of security and affordability. In this sense the power of 
landlords versus tenants is now far out of balance. 
Yet, this is not to argue for the transplantation of one particular model 
– as Kemp and Kofner (2014) persuasively argue, systems of tenure 
are quite strongly embedded and shifts towards liberalisation are more 
readily achieved than shifts towards re-regulation. Shifting towards 
greater security and stability for tenants would therefore be challenging, 
as, indeed, the German experience with the introduction of the 
‘rent brake’ would appear to demonstrate.
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Stretching tenancies
One of the major differences between England and Germany is the 
average tenancy length. Not only would encouraging longer tenancies in 
England offer greater security for tenants, it would also have the potential 
to keep a check on rental costs by reducing the number of contract 
breaks – points at which rents are more likely to be raised. Quality may 
also improve if tenants are able to feel a greater sense of ownership, 
while the opportunity to rent in a more secure way might start to shift 
attitudes away from the prioritisation of home ownership.
Stretching tenancy length beyond the current 6–12 months could also 
unlock some existing potential protections that are currently constrained 
by short tenancies, including those that allow tenants to appeal excessive 
rents, or to have their demands to have improved housing conditions or 
management taken seriously. 
Short of legislative change to change tenancies across the board, 
which the government remains reluctant to do, there are actions the 
government could pursue to gradually increase tenancy lengths.
• Government should let local authorities, through the planning 
process, require new build-to-rent schemes offer tenancies of 
a minimum of two years, with an appropriate break clause for 
tenants.  Local authorities could achieve this through section 106 
agreements if appropriate policy support were included in the 
National Planning Policy Framework.
• Any private rented scheme supported by public money or land 
should require a proportion of homes to offer tenancies of a 
minimum of two years. 
However, an increasing number of social housing providers such as 
housing associations and local authorities have entered the rental market 
as a means of providing themselves with long-term income streams and 
balancing their property portfolios. Given their social purpose:
• not-for-profit builders should lead by example. With housing 
associations and local authorities moving into direct development 
of market rent housing, they should offer households a range of 
longer-term tenancy options in their purpose built PRS schemes. 
It would be helpful to amend schedule one of the Housing Act 
1988 to allow local authorities to offer assured shorthold tenancies 
(which they are currently barred from doing), as part of new-build 
schemes, but with longer tenancies and appropriate break clauses. 
Across each of these, tenancy agreements should fix any future 
rent rises upfront, in writing. 
Finally, there is a role for public actors involved in the lettings market to 
be influencing the length of tenancies, such as social lettings agencies, 
but also public online lettings instruments like RentSquare.
• Not-for-profit lettings agencies and public online lettings 
services (such as RentSquare) should provide incentives and 
services discounts to private landlords offering longer-term 
rental contracts. 
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Helping with housing costs
Growing the market of longer-term tenancies should reduce the 
incidence of rent increases, and thus act as a stabilising force on rent 
inflation. Given that rent controls in England are unlikely to happen in the 
next decade, there are nonetheless changes which could help tenants in 
enforcing their rights against excessive rents, and lessons drawn from 
the German rental system that could prove helpful. 
For one, publishing local, up-to-date rent tables would help landlords set 
their rents appropriately, and allow tenants the opportunity to contest 
rents with landlords prior to signing (or re-signing) their contract – 
but also to contest excessive rents with property tribunals. As such:
• the Valuation Office Agency should publish more granular detail 
on the local cost of renting so tenants know whether they are 
paying a reasonable local rate. This should include the full 
range of property types (detached, semi, room, maisonette) and 
property sizes alongside the average prices at the ward level. 
As well as allowing tenants to informally challenge their rent 
with their landlord, it would also support tenants to contest 
unreasonable rents through the tribunal process. 
As well as the costs of rents, deposits in both England and Germany 
(where tenants need to pay several month’s rent in advance, often while 
awaiting the recovery of a previous deposit) remain a significant hurdle 
for low income tenants to overcome. As such:
• local authorities and governments should work with the 
insurance industry to establish an insurance product to 
replace the tenancy deposit.
In addition, while there will continue to be an important role for 
managing agents to help manage properties when things go wrong, 
new technologies bring opportunities to reduce the costs of the lettings 
role of letting agents. As such:
• both Germany and England should continue to experiment 
with online platforms (such as RentSquare) to link up landlords 
directly with tenants, and cut out letting agent fees and contract 
renewal costs.
Improving representation 
While representation of tenants within the electorate is unlikely to change 
noticeably in the absence of wider reform to registration and franchise 
procedures, taking a lead from the tenants’ association system in Germany, 
tenants in England could enjoy greater voice and protection through an 
elevated role for trade unions in representing the private tenants. 
Trade unions already have structures in place that could bring 
accommodation and rental concerns into their remit to offer advice 
and support to members. More critically, however, a trade union role in 
offering legal protection would be a move forward in ensuring tenants 
are helped to take on badly performing landlords, challenge poor 
conditions and oppose unwarranted or disproportionate rent increases. 
We therefore make the following recommendations.
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• Trade unions should work together with housing charities and 
TMOs in taking a more active role in supporting private tenants, 
helping them with legal advice, helping to dispute excessive 
rents, and supporting them in challenging landlords on property 
conditions and management issues.
• A longer-term goal should be to start a tenants’ association 
nationally, with local branches, to mirror the German model. 
• Alternatively, tenants’ insurance offers could be extended to 
cover legal fees which would provide similar opportunities for 
supporting tenants to challenge landlords. 
Ultimately, a more robust set of tenancy laws for England, which set out 
a clearer balance between the rights of the landlord and the rights of the 
tenant, would be the right objective for the government to pursue. 
In the meantime, there is much the government and also other 
non-government actors can do. The German model may be imperfect, 
and create insider/outsider issues that are undesirable. German law 
should also be revised so that the costs of modernisation for energy 
efficiency improvements can no longer be transferred entirely to the 
tenant in the form of increased rents – a system which can see rents 
become unaffordable, circumventing other tenancy protections. 
Nevertheless, it provides many lessons for English policymakers 
on how to increase tenancy lengths and support a more stable and 
secure model of tenure, as Germany has managed to deliver.
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